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For a number of decades, different fields of knowledge,
including psychology, economics, and neurosciences,
have focused their research efforts on a better understand-
ing of the decision-making process. Making decisions
based on the probability of future events is routine in every-
day life; it occurs whenever individuals select an option
from several alternatives, each one associated with a spe-
cific value. Sometimes subjects decide knowing the pre-
cise outcomes of each option, but commonly they have to
decide without knowing the consequences (because either
ambiguity or risk is involved). Stress has a broad impact on
animal behaviors, affects brain regions involved in
decision-making processes, and, when maladaptive, is a
trigger for neuropsychiatric disorders. This Mini-Review
provides a comprehensive overview on how stress impacts
decision-making processes, particularly under uncertain
conditions. Understanding this can prove to be useful for
intervention related to impairments to decision-making
processes that present in several stress-triggered neuro-
psychiatric disorders. VC 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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During the past decades, different fields of knowl-
edge, including psychology, economics, and neuroscien-
ces, have focused on the decision-making process,
highlighting its broad impact and huge complexity and
contributing to the rise of a new area devoted to the study
of brain computations implicated in valued decisions
(Rangel et al., 2008). Making decisions based on the
probability of future events is routine in everyday life; it
occurs whenever individuals select an option from several
alternatives, each one associated with a specific value. To
manage limited resources, living organisms have to make
critical decisions that have survival value, which means
that being a good decider has selective and evolutionary
impact (Kalenscher and van Wingerden, 2011). Con-
versely, impaired/poor decision making can have cata-
strophic consequences and constitutes an important
feature of several neuropsychiatric disorders, such as schiz-
ophrenia, anxiety disorders, substance abuse disorders,
obsessive compulsive disorder, and pathological gambling
(for review see Ernst and Paulus, 2005).
Decisions are driven by values, subjective attributes
tagged to the different options at the beginning of the
decision-making process and representing the benefits/
gains expected from each. This valuation process and the
following decisions are modulated by several variables,
including uncertainty, cost and effort, delay, and social
modulators, the contribution of which will be briefly
reviewed.
Sometimes individuals decide knowing the precise
outcomes of each option, but more often they have to bet
without an exact knowledge of the consequences (Hsu
et al., 2005). “Uncertainty” refers to this lack of knowl-
edge concerning the outcomes of a specific choice (Hsu
et al., 2005). Uncertain events can be categorized by the
confidence in the probability assignment to each out-
come. “Ambiguity” refers to situations in which the out-
comes cannot be fully specified and/or their probability is
completely unknown, and “risk” refers to situations in
which the distribution (or probability) of each possible
outcome is (at least partially) known, with a continuum
between both extremes. It is believed that the processing
of ambiguity and risk is supported by distinct neural
mechanisms involving different brain regions (activation
within the lateral prefrontal cortex is related to ambiguity,
whereas activation of the posterior parietal cortex is pre-
dicted by risk preference; Huettel et al., 2006). In con-
trast, whether value and uncertainty share common
neuronal circuits/mechanisms is still an open question.
Uncertainty about an outcome is thought to modu-
late our choices according to a simple linear model in
which its probability weighs the utility of the outcome
(the expected-utility model, devised by Bernoulli in
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1738, “p 3 u”). An individual deviating from the predic-
tions of the model would be risk prone if he or she over-
valued p and risk-averse if he or she undervalued it. The
expected utility models are useful as frameworks for
understanding decision making under uncertainty but are
subject to frequent violations across a wide range of com-
mon situations (Platt and Huettel, 2008). Uncertainty is
the main contributor to these deviations, not only because
the probability of outcomes in real life is commonly
unknown but also because of limitations in the human
capacity to estimate probabilities. These limitations are
easily recognized in pathological gamblers and include
overvaluation of winning outcomes and undervaluation
of losing outcomes, overrepresentation of rare events,
overgeneralization based on sparse data, and superstitious
beliefs relating to game-controlling outcomes.
Making good decisions implies an estimate not only
of the value and the likelihood of each reward but also of
the costs and the efforts implied in obtaining it. This valu-
ation integrates the hedonic properties of a stimulus
(“liking”), characteristics that remain constant in addition
to changes in motivation or devaluation procedures, and
the disposition to overcome costs in order to obtain a
goal (“wanting”; Kurniawan et al., 2011). Animals
(including humans) experience effort as a burden and
tend to avoid effortful actions when reward magnitude is
kept constant (Kool et al., 2010). Furthermore, to reach a
desired goal, animals are ready to expend efforts that
encompass an accurate integration of costs and benefits of
each action. Disorders of the dopamine system, such as
schizophrenia or stimulant addiction, are associated with
impairments in effort-based decision making. Whereas
schizophrenic patients tend to avoid high-effort options
(Fervaha et al., 2013), amphetamine users display
enhanced willingness to exert effort, particularly when
reward probability is lower (Wardle et al., 2011).
Another relevant factor for decisions that has been
extensively studied in recent years is the delay in obtain-
ing the outcome. Along with risk and effort, individuals
usually include the time lag involved in obtaining the
reward in the decision algorithm. Preference for small
rewards delivered immediately over larger rewards deliv-
ered after a delay is commonly known as delay discounting.
Higher rates of delay discounting result in a pattern of
impulsive choice and are associated with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (Barkley et al., 2001), addictive dis-
orders (Kirby and Petry, 2004), and pathological gambling
(Madden et al., 2009), disorders in which the ability to
delay gratification is significantly impaired.
Decisions are commonly made in social contexts
and are frequently subjected to judgment by others; the
latter is, particularly in humans, an important modulator
of decision-making behaviors. Social interactions may
affect decisions in several aspects, including the social
learning that has been shown to be crucial for adaptive
decision making because it avoids the costs and the risks
associated with individual learning (Laland, 2004), the
inclusion of the potential benefits of cooperation and the
putative costs of competition in the valuation of compet-
ing options (West et al., 2007), the tendency to adapt
behaviors to match the rest of the group (conformity;
Laland, 2004), and the exhibition of coordinated patterns
of behaviors by social groups (such as traffic flow in
human crowds; Helbing and Molnar, 1995). Some studies
have explored neurobiological correlates of social modu-
lation in decision making and contributed to identifying
aberrant neural substrates underlying social abnormalities
observed in psychiatric disorders, such as frequent with-
draw from social interactions in depression and late phases
of schizophrenia; incorrect interpretation of social interac-
tions in antisocial personality disorder, borderline person-
ality disorder, and autism; and persistent violation of
social norms and elevated levels of aggressive behaviors in
antisocial personality disorder (for review see Rilling
et al., 2002; van den Bos et al., 2013). Here we review
the impact of stress in decisions and its modulators, with a
particular focus on the processing of risk and uncertainty.
STRESS
Stress is defined by the physiological response of the orga-
nism to any challenging or demanding stimulus (Selye,
1998). Independently of the nature of such stimuli, the
stress response is characterized by a neuroendocrine
response under control of the hypothalamus. Acutely,
there is sympathetic nervous system activation and the
consequent release of cathecolamines from the adrenal
medulla. This fast-acting but short-lived response is
accompanied by an activation of the hypothalamus–pitui-
tary–adrenal (HPA) axis that results in the sequential
release of corticotrophin-related factor by the hypothala-
mus, adrenocorticotropic hormone by the pituitary, and
corticosteroids by the adrenal cortex (mainly cortisol in
primates and humans and corticosterone in rodents; Sapol-
sky et al., 1986). The activation of the HPA axis with an
increase in cortisol levels is the hallmark of the stress
response, particularly in chronic conditions in which the
fast catecholaminergic response has long waned. Although
the consequences of sympathetic overactivation are
observed mainly in the periphery, the glucocorticoids can
easily enter the central nervous system and modulate its
activity via both mineralocorticoid and glucocorticoid
receptors, which are widely present in the brain. The stress
response is considered adaptive, contributing to the resto-
ration of homeostasis (de Kloet et al., 2008). However,
when the exposure to a stressful stimulus is of sufficient
intensity or prolonged in time, it can become deleterious
and have a particular impact in the structure and function
of the brain (for review see Sousa and Almeida, 2012).
Thus, when analyzing the impact of stress, it is of
utmost importance to differentiate acute from chronic
stress because these have very distinct and, sometimes,
opposite consequences. For example, whereas acute stress
(via corticosteroids) might promote memory consolida-
tion, chronic stress impairs memory consolidation and
retrieval (Roozendaal, 2002). Thus, in the remainder of
this Mini-Review, the impact of chronic and acute stress
exposures will be separately presented and discussed.
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CHRONIC STRESS AND THE NEURONAL
NETWORKS IMPLICATED IN DECISION
MAKING
Decision-making processes are mediated by parallel cir-
cuits linking the cerebral cortex and the basal ganglia that
encode three distinct (and, somehow, conflicting) valuat-
ing systems, goal-directed, habit-based, and pavlovian/
conditioning systems. These circuits are key targets of
chronic stress exposure, mainly but not exclusively
through activation of glucocorticoid receptors (Sousa and
Almeida, 2012).
The goal-directed system requires top-down proc-
essing of numerical and abstract concepts that encompass
the consistency of choices and is modulated by variables
related to cognition, attention, and expertise. The medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), in particular the prelimbic
region and the dorsomedial striatum (DMS; caudate in
humans), is a key components of the corticostriatal circuit
regulating goal-directed choice, called the associative net-
work (Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010; Fig. 1). The DMS,
in particular, is central in this circuit and is crucial for
learning and expressing goal-directed behaviors (Yin
et al., 2005); it receives inputs directly from association
cortices and projects to areas known to participate in
action control, such as the substantia nigra pars reticulata
and the mediodorsal nucleus of the thalamus. In addition,
the DMS is also involved in assigning value to outcomes
(Balleine, 2005). In contrast to the DMS, the specific role
of the mPFC is less well understood. Although it does not
appear to be crucial to goal-directed action (Ostlund and
Balleine, 2005), it is involved in updating the assignment
of predicted values for each possible outcome (St. Onge
and Floresco, 2009), a specific feature of goal-directed
behavior. In this regard, the intense dopaminergic projec-
tion from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) to the prelim-
bic cortex is particularly noteworthy (Naneix et al.,
2009), given that dopamine-producing cells have been
shown to compute the difference between the expected
and the actual value of an outcome, often called reward
prediction error (Cohen et al., 2012). It is noteworthy that
the anterior cingulate cortex, another mPFC region, has
also been shown to encode the expected value of an out-
come, factoring the real magnitude of the reward and its
cost (including its risk, its delay, and the effort necessary
to retrieve it; Knutson et al., 2005; Kable and Glimcher,
2007; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008); its activation
increases as a function of cognitive control demanded by
the task (Brown and Braver, 2005). Chronic stress
response induces an overall atrophy and hypofunction of
this network that correlates with a facilitated shift from
goal-directed to habit-based decisions (Dias-Ferreira
et al., 2009, for rodents; Soares et al., 2012, for humans).
Indeed, chronic stress exposure is known to decrease the
overall volume and the size of dendritic trees of neurons
in the anterior cingulate cortex and in the prelimbic area
of the PFC (Radley et al., 2005; Cerqueira et al., 2007b)
and the DMS (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009; Soares et al.,
2012) and to disturb other key functions of these regions,
including working memory (Mizoguchi et al., 2000; Cer-
queira et al., 2007b) and reversal learning (Cerqueira
et al., 2007a). Paradoxically, in rodents, chronic stress
exposure has been shown to increase the power of the
local field potentials in these regions, particularly at lower
frequency bands (Oliveira et al., 2013), together with
neuronal spiking frequency, whereas the firing bursts
were generally decreased (Lee et al., 2011). Stress also
impairs the dopaminergic inputs (mainly from the VTA)
to the mPFC (Mizoguchi et al., 2000), which might
interfere with the reward prediction error signaling mech-
anism discussed above. Additionally, other cortical and
subcortical areas that play a role in goal-directed decision
making, including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC; Cook and Wellman, 2004; Cerqueira et al.,
2007a) and the medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; Dias-
Ferreira et al., 2009), are similarly affected by chronic
stress. These two, in particular, constitute the vmPFC
that encodes the expected future reward attributable to a
chosen action (Gl€ascher et al., 2009) and are associated
with action–outcome but not stimulus–response decisions
(Valentin et al., 2007). In contrast, the OFC has been
shown to be critically involved in goal-directed behaviors
by holding information on relationships between envi-
ronmental patterns and somatic states induced by those
patterns. Interacting reciprocally with the OFC, the baso-
lateral amygdala (BLA) plays an important role in forming
representations linking cues to outcome expectancies
(Pickens et al., 2003) and promoting the assignment of
incentive value to predicted outcome (Balleine and
O’Doherty, 2010), a function that seems to be mediated
by local opioid receptors (Wassum et al., 2009). The
OFC seems to be essential to keep these representations
updated and stored in memory (Pickens et al., 2003).
Additionally, the BLA, by its known connections with
the hypothalamus, seems to be responsible for processing
affective and motivational properties of outcomes. The
BLA influences the corticostriatal circuit through its direct
projections to the prelimbic cortex, DMS, and mediodor-
sal thalamus and its indirect projections to the ventral
striatum via the insular cortex. The stress-induced hyper-
trophy (Vyas et al., 2002; Pe^go et al., 2008) and increased
activation of the BLA (Zhang and Rosenkranz, 2012)
could result in increased modulation of the goal-directed
circuit, although the specifics of such influence are still to
be defined. Finally, the ventral striatum, specifically the
core part of the nucleus accumbens, has also been shown
to be crucial for instrumental performance, participating
in translating motivation into actions (for review see Bal-
leine and O’Doherty, 2010) and also being targeted by
chronic stress (Bessa et al., 2013).
With intensive training and repetition, control of
actions can be transferred to the habit-based system.
Habitual actions involve an ordered, structured action
sequence that can be quickly elicited by particular rewards
(Graybiel, 2008) and can be neutral, desirable, or undesir-
able. The sensorimotor network, a circuit that includes
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the sensorimotor cortex and the dorsolateral striatum
(DLS; putamen in humans) as key components, has been
shown not only to be implicated in habit formation but
also to be affected by stress in both rodents (Dias-Ferreira
et al., 2009) and humans (Soares et al., 2012). Indeed,
whereas the sensorimotor cortex seems to be resilient to
the impact of chronic stress, the DLS and its neurons
enlarged upon chronic stress exposure, which correlates
with an increased propensity toward habitual behavior
(Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009; Soares et al., 2012). This pro-
pensity might not depend only on such structural changes,
given that after an instance of acute stress human subjects
showed a similar potentiation of habitual behavior
(Schwabe and Wolf, 2009). It is known that the habitual
stimulus–response learning is modulated by dopaminergic
projections from the substantia nigra and the VTA into
the DLS, encoding the assignment of a specific value for
each action and promoting the acquisition of a response
to conditioning stimulus by striatal neurons (Aosaki et al.,
1994).
With the pavlovian conditioning system, individuals
learn to associate a particular cue/stimulus with a reward.
This is an innate passive learning procedure, associated
with a limited repertoire of actions that include automatic
behaviors, such as preparing to eat when approaching a
table with food or approaching the reward magazine
when an outcome is delivered in a decision-making appa-
ratus (Rangel et al., 2008). The neural basis of the pavlov-
ian system includes responses to stimuli with specific
spatial organization in the dorsal periaqueductal gray
(Keay et al., 2001) and is encoded in a neural network
involving the OFC, ventral striatum, and BLA (Gottfried
et al., 2003; Ostlund and Balleine, 2007). As mentioned
above, all these regions are impacted by chronic stress
exposure, which might explain why chronic stress expo-
sure was recently shown to affect pavlovian-to-
instrumental transfer (Morgado et al., 2012b). The OFC
stores information on the relationships between environ-
mental cues and somatic states induced by them; thus, it is
crucial not only to action–outcome learning but also to
stimulus–response conditioning. It seems that lateral and
central parts of the OFC, receiving inputs from sensory
areas, are involved in pavlovian valuing, whereas medial
parts participate in associative learning networks.
From thios it becomes clear that stress, in particular
chronic stress, exposure has a major impact on the brain
networks involved in decision making. However, simi-
larly to other behaviors, this impact appears to be bidirec-
tional, impairing the functioning of some areas and
networks while promoting that of others. Globally, stress
favors the sensorimotor network subserving habitual
behaviors at the expense of the goal-associative network.
To oversimplify, this fact results in more habit-based
responses and a general impairment of actions based on
goals. More importantly, however, is the impact of stress
on the other areas that process the different parameters
that modulate decisions, including risk and uncertainty, in
which its actions are only starting to be elucidated.
STRESS AND RISKY DECISION MAKING
Exposure to chronic stress has been shown to disrupt sev-
eral brain functions that are associated with significant
impairments in memory (Sousa et al., 1998; Sousa and
Almeida, 2012), working memory (Mizoguchi et al.,
2000; Cerqueira et al., 2007b), behavioral flexibility (Cer-
queira et al., 2007a), anxiety (Pe^go et al., 2006), mood
(Bessa et al., 2009), habit formation (Dias-Ferreira et al.,
2009), and pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer (Morgado
et al., 2012b). Because these functions are crucial for deci-
sion making, several studies have been conducted to
explore this impact. In a recent review, Starcke and Brand
(2012) explored the impact of stress on decisions, specifi-
cally those taken by patients suffering from stress-related
disorders or under the influence of acutely induced labo-
ratory stress. Stress was found to affect decisions signifi-
cantly; however, its effects and subsequent decision
strategies vary according to type of decision task and type
of stressor applied. Additionally, these (almost acute) labo-
ratory situations do not mimic some features of chronic
and/or natural stress that humans experience in daily life.
For a number of years, few studies have focused spe-
cifically on the impact of stress on risk-based decision
making (Table I summarizes some articles on stress and
decision making). In contrast to other types, risk-based
decisions are not strictly divided into favorable and unfav-
orable options, allowing other types of calculations based
on an individual’s proneness to risk and not based merely
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of chronic stress effects on structures and
circuits involved in instrumental and pavlovian conditioning. Chronic
stress induces a shift from the associative network (blue), involved in goal-
directed behaviors, through the sensorimotor network (orange) responsible
for habit-based behaviors. Pavlovian conditioning (green) was also affected
by stress. PL, prelimbic cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; OFC,
orbitofrontal cortex; SM, sensorimotor cortex; NAC, nucleus accumbens;
BLA, basolateral amygdala; DMS, dorsomedial striatum; DLS, dorsolateral
striatum; MD, mediodorsal thalamus; VA, ventral anterior thalamus; SNr,
substantia nigra pars reticulate; SNc, substantia nigra pars compacta; VTA,
ventral tegmental area. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,
which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
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on the ability to perform advantageous choices. More-
over, these reports display great disparity in duration of
stress exposure, nature, and/or types of stressors and task
design that greatly increases complexity when analyzing
the results. The following analyzes the effects of acute and
chronic stress on decision making.
Effects of Acute Stress
Acute stress leads to improved performance in deci-
sion tasks (Bourne and Yaroush, 2003) that can be corre-
lated with enhanced learning from positive outcomes and
decreased learning from negative outcomes (Petzold
et al., 2010; Lighthall et al., 2012). However, such a posi-
tive effect is dependent on the complexity of the task, the
intensity of the stressor, the level of the arousal, and the
individual characteristics of the subjects, such as cognitive
and technical skills (Bourne and Yaroush, 2003; Lupien
et al., 2009).
When decisions have involved some degree of
uncertainty, the reported effects of acute stress have been
consistent, independent of the experimental paradigm. In
general, stressed individuals tend to display increased lev-
els of risk taking or increased rates of risky choices
whether outcomes are advantageous (Lighthall et al.,
2009) or disadvantageous (van den Bos et al., 2009). This
effect was described by Johnson et al. (2012) and Galvan
and McGlennen (2012) in adolescents subjected to daily
stress or to the Trier Social Stress Test, respectively, and
also in experiments using the Iowa Gambling Task (Pres-
ton et al., 2007) and the Game of Dice Task (Starcke
et al., 2008), paradigms in which participants have to
choose between large-disadvantageous and small-
advantageous options. In the same vein, acute stress has
been shown to bias choices for risky options when deci-
sions involve losses rather than gains (Porcelli and Del-
gado, 2009). These latter effects seem to be mediated by
glucocorticoids because, as with stress, animals acutely
injected with corticosterone displayed an increased rate of
high-risk options in an equivalent rodent task, emphasiz-
ing the decreased sensitivity to losses induced by these
hormones (Koot et al., 2013).
Despite this consistent pattern of increased risk pref-
erence induced by acute stress, effects were observed to be
dependent on age, gender, and other individual character-
istics. Acute stress was found to exacerbate risk seeking in
men and risk aversion in women (Lighthall et al., 2009), a
gender effect replicated by van den Bos et al. (2009), who
found a stress-induced improvement on performance in
females (by using a more conservative pattern of choice)
and poorer decisions in males when performing the Iowa
Gambling Task. In another human study, Porcelli and
Delgado (2009) highlighted the critical relevance of indi-
vidual characteristics in the evaluation of stress impact on
decisions. By using a financial decision-making task, they
found that acute stress exacerbates behavioral biases in
decision making, showing that people who are generally
risk averse tend to play more safely, whereas those who
tend to be risk seekers make more risky choices.
Paradoxical effects of acute stress were reported
from a study using the Game of Dice Task; risk taking
was promoted when the task was performed 28 minutes
after stress induction, and risk aversion was favored when
the task was performed 5 or 18 minutes after stress (Pabst
et al., 2013a). These stress-induced effects seem to be
ameliorated if an executive task is performed simultane-
ously (Pabst et al., 2013b). Despite methodological limita-
tions (small samples and absence of significant differences
between stress and controls at two time points), these
results illustrate the differential roles of catecholamines
and cortisol as mediators of acute stress effects on risky
decision making, a research line that has not been
adequately addressed.
Humans are intrinsically averse to risk and, even
more, to ambiguity. Even when risky options have a posi-
tive expected value, subjects preferred to play it more
safely (Platt and Huettel, 2008). Therefore, even when
decisions are preferably risky, risk taking is likely to be
viewed as inappropriate. Several studies have been
designed to understand the neurobiological mechanisms
that contribute to the occurrence of such misprocessing of
risk. For example, individuals with decision-making
impairments that lead to increased risk taking displayed
high insular activation compared with controls, which is
consistent with increased insular activation seen when
healthy individuals choose higher-risk outcomes (Paulus
et al., 2003). This increased activation might contribute
to the natural risk-averse pattern of choice by its putative
role in representing somatic states related to potential neg-
ative consequences of risk and loss (Damasio, 1996; Pau-
lus et al., 2003). Although data on the impact of chronic
stress in insular structure and function are scarce, recent
studies have shown that both patients with posttraumatic
stress disorder and persons with increased cumulative life
adversity display decreased insular volumes (Ansell et al.,
2012; Herringa et al., 2012). Moreover, acute stress-
induced changes in insular activation correlated with per-
formance in a risky decision-making task (the Balloon
Analog Risk Task, see below) and were gender specific,
with males showing increased activation and higher
reward collection, whereas females showed the opposite
pattern (Lighthall et al., 2012). By using neuroimaging
tools, a recent study examined the effects of different
types of uncertainty on neural processes of decision mak-
ing; compared with risk, ambiguous conditions produced
higher activation of the OFC, amygdala, and dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex, whereas the DMS (caudate nucleus)
and precuneus cortex were more activated during risk
(Hsu et al., 2005). Altogether, these findings provide use-
ful insights on how brain functions are altered under acute
stress and on the regions involved in risk-based decision
making processes.
Effects of Chronic Stress
Few studies have addressed the impact of chronic
and repetitive stress on risk-based decision-making proc-
esses. Honk et al. (2003) have established that individuals
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with low baseline cortisol levels display higher rates of
risk choices in the Iowa Gambling Task. They hypothe-
sized that this disadvantageous behavior was related to
insensitivity to losses and increased reward dependence
among these individuals. In contrast, Kandasamy et al.
(2014) described how administration of hydrocortisone (a
corticosteroid) increased risk aversion in a lottery game,
an effect whose magnitude is gender dependent. How-
ever, this contradiction between the two studies is only
apparent. Whereas in the Honk et al. study choice pat-
terns were related to basal cortisol levels, which are a con-
stitutive characteristic of individuals, Kandasamy and
colleagues evaluated the impact of cortisol elevation, rep-
licating in a more natural way the impact of chronic stress.
Preliminary data from our laboratory demonstrate that a
risk-averse pattern of choice is induced by chronic stress
in a rodent risk-based decision-making paradigm (Mor-
gado et al., 2012a, 2014), in line with Kandasamy et al.’s
observations.
These results might be related to a chronic-stress
induced impairment of reward processing in the mPFC.
Indeed, in a functional magnetic resonance imaging study,
Tom et al. (2007) observed that gains and losses promote
changes in similar regions, including the striatum,
vmPFC, and anterior cingulate cortex, with putative gains
enhancing activation and putative losses decreasing activa-
tion. However, decreased activity induced by losses in the
striatum and the vmPFC was greater than increased activ-
ity induced by similar gains in other regions of interest.
Additionally, the same study showed an interesting corre-
lation between behavioral and loss aversion in several
regions, such as the ventral striatum and the vmPFC.
Because these regions are a key target of chronic stress,
which hampers their structure and function (Soares et al.,
2012), this suggests a direct link between stress exposure
and changes in loss-aversion patterns. In this regard, acute
stress was shown to induce reduction in reward-related
PFC function (Ossewaarde et al., 2011), whereas a recent
study correlated higher levels of perceived stress with
blunted mPFC responses to gains and losses (Treadway
et al., 2013).
These findings are in accordance with literature that
identifies decision impairments in patients suffering from
stress-related psychiatric disorders. In obsessive compul-
sive disorder, for instance, patients consistently displayed a
risk-averse pattern of choices while showing significantly
elevated levels of blood cortisol and self-reported stress
(Morgado et al., 2013). Thus, it can be assumed that
impairments observed in decision making could be pro-
voked and/or exacerbated by chronic stress, which points
to the reduction of stress and the development of more
adaptive coping strategies as putative interventions to
ameliorate behavioral alterations associated with that psy-
chiatric condition.
CONCLUSIONS
Making decisions is one of the most complex cognitive
processes, involving sequential steps that include analysis
of internal and external states, valuation of different
options available, and action selection. Because decisions
are often made under stress, it becomes critical to know
how stress impacts decision making in the context of
uncertainty. Acute stress seems to enhance decision biases,
mainly increasing risky choices in accordance with perso-
nal characteristics such as gender and individual proneness
to risk. Less is known about the effects of chronic stress
on decision-making processes that involve risk, a field
that requires attention because it might open new per-
spectives of approach to different neuropsychiatric condi-
tions in which these impairments are central.
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